TL;DR The duty gap between China and Cambodia has narrowed rather than disappeared. Relocating final assembly can cut duty but often leaves components, tooling and quality risk in China, so the decision should be made on documented origin rules and total cost, not on the headline tariff alone.
"Move it to Cambodia" has become the default answer to any tariff question. In 2026 that answer is less obviously right than it was two years ago, because the duty advantage has compressed while the operational cost of moving has not.
This is not an argument against diversifying. It is an argument for doing the arithmetic before committing tooling and a twelve-month qualification cycle to a country you have never sourced from.
What the tariff numbers actually look like
After the Section 301 expansion in July 2026, goods from Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines face a 12.5% additional rate, while Cambodia, Indonesia and Malaysia sit at 10%, according to Fortune's October 2026 analysis of the China-plus-one shift. Cambodia's rate has applied since 24 July 2026, with a separate excess-capacity investigation still pending, per industry analysis published by Manhattan SEZ.
Two things follow. First, Cambodia is cheaper than Vietnam on duty, but by a margin measured in percentage points, not tens of points. Second, the gap is policy, not geography — it can move again with a single announcement.
Why the differential narrowed
The compression happened because Southeast Asian rates rose, not because China's fell. At the same time, the US-China relationship moved into a temporary truce: roughly $30 billion of goods on each side were identified for potential reductions after the October 2026 summit.
For a buyer, this creates an uncomfortable planning environment. A relocation decision justified by a 2025 tariff table may not survive a 2027 revision.
What actually moves — and what does not
Labour-intensive assembly with shallow bills of material moves most easily: textiles, footwear, simple lighting, basic home goods. What does not move is the component ecosystem — drivers, power supplies, precision parts, specialty fabrics, and the tooling that makes them.
In practice many "Cambodian" programmes are Chinese component supply with Cambodian final assembly. That can be a legitimate configuration. It is only a problem when the origin claim assumes more local transformation than actually happens.
The origin question is the whole decision
Customs does not ask where the last screw was turned. It asks whether the processing met the applicable origin rule and whether you can prove it.
Ask a broker, in writing, which rule your product would satisfy and which records would evidence it. Then ask the Cambodian factory whether they produce those records today — not whether they could start. A factory that cannot document its bill of materials and process flow cannot support an origin claim, no matter how good the sample looks.
What relocation really costs
Beyond duty, budget for these lines, because they are the ones that get left out of the business case:
- Tooling duplication, or the cost of shipping and requalifying existing moulds
- Dual quality systems during the transition, with inspection in two countries
- Longer component lead times and additional buffer inventory
- Engineering travel and a slower first-article approval cycle
- Management attention — the least visible and usually the largest cost
A decision checklist
- Landed cost modelled for both countries, per SKU, including duty, freight and buffer
- Origin rule confirmed in writing by a customs broker
- Component sourcing map drawn before, not after, the move
- Local content percentage verified against factory records
- Tooling ownership and transfer terms agreed in the contract
- A plan for what happens if the tariff gap closes again
Where this leaves buyers
Cambodia remains a sensible second base for the right product. It is not a general-purpose discount. The buyers who do well are the ones who treat relocation as an origin-and-operations project with a tariff line attached, rather than a tariff project with an operations problem attached.
FAQ
Is Cambodia still cheaper than China for US exports in 2026?
Not by default. Cambodia faces a lower additional duty than several Southeast Asian peers, but component imports, logistics and lower local supplier depth can offset the difference, so the comparison has to be made SKU by SKU.
Does assembling in Cambodia make the product Cambodian for customs purposes?
Only if the processing satisfies the applicable origin rule and you can document it. Screwdriver assembly of imported parts often does not qualify, and an unsupported origin claim is a compliance risk rather than a saving.
Which products relocate well to Cambodia?
Labour-intensive, low-tooling, high-volume assembly tends to move most easily, such as textiles, footwear, simple lighting and basic home goods. Products with deep component ecosystems usually stay closer to their supply base.
What should I ask a Cambodian factory before quoting?
Ask which components they currently import, what their local content percentage is, who owns the tooling, and whether they can provide the production records your customs broker would need to support an origin claim.
Sources
- Fortune — Why the China plus one supply-chain shift is paying off less — https://fortune.com/2026/10/05/southeast-asia-china-plus-one-manufacturing/ (2026-10-05)
- Manhattan SEZ — Lighting factory setup in Cambodia (2026) — https://www.manhattansez.com/en/cambodia-lighting-led-manufacturing/ (2026-07-14)
- Value Add VC — China+1 manufacturing ranked 2026 — https://valueaddvc.com/blog/china1-manufacturing-how-startups-and-brands-are-diversifying-away-from-chinese-factories (2026-09-02)
- CBS News — Chinese factories relocate to Cambodia's special economic zone — https://www.cbsnews.com/news/avoiding-trumps-tariffs-some-chinese-companies-relocate-to-cambodias-special-economic-zone/ (2025-03-05)